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Synthetic horsepox virus raises concerns
The report of the construction of an infectious horsepox virus from synthesized DNA by
Noyce, Lederman, and Evans [1] raised considerable concerns about whether this study will
facilitate the construction of smallpox virus (variola) using synthetic biology [2–5]. This is a
valid concern, but for a number of reasons—as explained below—no major change concerning
the likelihood of a “resurrection” of smallpox emerges from this publication. Having said this,
it is also evident that the scientific community, politicians, decision makers, and the lay public
have to continue, and probably intensify, a discussion on benefits and risks of synthetic biology
in a broader sense.
What has been done?
The study “Construction of an infectious horsepox virus vaccine from chemically synthesized
DNA fragments” was conducted in the laboratory of Dr. Evans, University of Alberta, Canada.
The authors describe a workflow from chemically synthesized DNA to the rescue of infectious
horsepox virus with the intention to generate a horsepox virus–based vaccine that may be
equally as efficacious as vaccinia virus–based vaccines but may have less severe side effects.
Since the introduction of vaccinia virus as a vaccine against smallpox by Edward Jenner more
than 200 years ago, the origin and passage history of this vaccine have remained elusive. How-
ever, recent sequencing data revealed close similarities between horsepox and vaccinia viruses,
suggesting that horsepox virus might serve as a candidate smallpox vaccine [6–8]. There is just
one problem: there have been no horsepox virus infections reported since the 1980s, and the
virus might actually be extinct [9]. Therefore, Evans and colleagues set out to “resurrect”
horsepox virus from synthesized DNA. To achieve this, they made use of (i) the ability of pox-
viruses to facilitate homologous recombination, (ii) a helpervirus (Shope fibroma virus) to
launch poxvirus replication from naked DNA [10], and (iii) recent advances in synthetic biol-
ogy, namely, the ability to chemically synthesize large DNA fragments.
Anything new?
The authors are now blamed for providing a workflow that allows for the generation of any
infectious poxvirus, including smallpox virus, from synthesized DNA (Fig 1). But is this actu-
ally new? According to the PLOS Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) Committee, “The
study did not provide new information specifically enabling the creation of a smallpox virus,
but uses known methods, reagents and knowledge that have previously been used in the syn-
thesis of other viruses (such as influenza and polio viruses)” [5]. Indeed, the individual experi-
mental steps and methods to generate infectious horsepox virus have been reported before.
PLOS Pathogens | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1007019 October 4, 2018 1 / 5
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Thiel V (2018) Synthetic viruses—
Anything new? PLoS Pathog 14(10): e1007019.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1007019
Editor: Carolyn B. Coyne, University of Pittsburgh,
UNITED STATES
Published: October 4, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Volker Thiel. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Funding: The author’s lab is supported by the
Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF grants
#310030_173085, CRSII3_160780,320030E-
165076) and the European Commission (Marie
Sklodowska-Curie Innovative Training Network;
grant agreement No 721367). The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Competing interests: The author is Associate
Editor of PLOS ONE and has handled the
manuscript "Construction of an infectious horsepox
virus vaccine from chemically synthesized DNA
fragments" by Noyce et al. The author is a member
of the Swiss Expert Committee for Biosafety
(SECB), a permanent federal advisory committee
that advises the Federal Council and the federal
First, it has long been known that poxviruses can mediate homologous recombination, and
this has been used for decades to modify mainly vaccinia virus, but also other poxviruses. It is
therefore not surprising that overlapping DNA fragments are joined in poxvirus-infected cells
by homologous recombination [10–12].
Second, procedures to rescue poxviruses from naked DNA have also been established for
decades [13, 14]. Helperviruses, such as fowlpox virus, are routinely used to launch replication
from naked vaccinia virus genomic DNA. This procedure has been successfully used to gener-
ate recombinant vaccinia viruses containing insertions of up to 26–31 kbp of foreign DNA [15,
16]. Moreover, fowlpox virus has also been used as a helpervirus to launch vaccinia virus repli-
cation from a full-length vaccinia virus DNA cloned as a bacterial artificial chromosome
(BAC) in Escherichia coli [17]. This work by Domi and Moss is remarkable because it demon-
strated for the first time that infectious vaccinia virus has been obtained from cloned circular
DNA as opposed to previous techniques that required a linear vaccinia virus genome with
authentic genome ends.
Fig 1. Cloning of synthetic DNA. The generation of synthetic poxviruses as described by Evans and colleagues and
cloning of synthetic DNA using TAR in yeast are illustrated. Synthesized DNA fragments are assembled and cloned in
a set of plasmids containing overlapping DNA fragments. Release of cloned DNA fragments from plasmids creates a
set of overlapping DNA fragments that can recombine in yeast (TAR cloning) to form a YAC/BAC (left side) or in
helpervirus-infected cells to rescue poxviruses (right side). The yeast hub is versatile and allows for the generation of
synthetic viruses, bacteria, and even eukaryotic chromosomes. BAC, bacterial artificial chromosome; TAR,
transformation-associated recombination; YAC, yeast artificial chromosome.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1007019.g001
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Third, it comes as no surprise that it is possible to generate infectious viruses by using syn-
thesized DNA fragments [18]. The first synthetic virus, poliovirus, was produced by Wimmer
and colleagues and made us aware of the fact that we entered a new era of reverse genetics that
allows for the generation of synthetic viruses without the need for a nucleic acid template [19].
This is instrumental to generate infectious viruses for which no isolates are available. The 1918
“Spanish” influenza virus is the first example of a “resurrected” virus that was constructed by
only knowing the genome sequence [20]. Also, more complex and larger RNA viruses, such as
coronaviruses (up to 30 kb genome size), can be synthesized, as demonstrated by Denison and
colleagues for a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-like virus [21]—a virus that was
sequenced from bat samples and represents the likely origin of the SARS coronavirus that
caused an epidemic starting in China in 2002.
Synthetic biology—Quo vadis?
The synthesis of infectious horsepox virus by Evans and colleagues demonstrates that synthetic
biology has entered the field of large DNA viruses. Although the procedure to generate syn-
thetic horsepox virus by Evans is quite specific for poxviruses, very general and widely applica-
ble procedures to assemble and clone large DNA fragments using transformation-associated
recombination (TAR) in yeast (Sacharomyces cerevisae) have been established. By using over-
lapping synthetic DNA fragments, TAR cloning, and yeast as a hub, it was possible to clone
full-length herpesvirus genomes (human cytomegalovirus [hCMV] and herpes simplex virus 1
[HSV1]) as yeast artificial chromosomes (YACs) [22, 23]. The YACs have been transferred
into E. coli for DNA amplification in the form of a BAC, and synthetic hCMV and HSV1 were
rescued following transfection into appropriate mammalian cells. This procedure is versatile
(Fig 1), and it is equally applicable to assemble and clone poxvirus genomes. Moreover, a
YAC/BAC carrying a poxvirus genome can be used to launch replication of infectious poxvi-
ruses as described by Domi and Moss [17].
These examples illustrate the fact that synthetic biology has matured towards a powerful
technique that will impact the scientific community—and our society in general—similar to
the advent of recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s. It is already possible to generate syn-
thetic bacteria [24–26] and eukaryotic chromosomes [27–34], and it can be expected that syn-
thetic eukaryotic cells will follow soon. Therefore, the impact of synthetic biology goes far
beyond the question of DURC, as in the case of viruses, and we have to find a way to cope with
the fact that this technology will allow the generation of designer microbes and, ultimately,
synthetic life.
In Switzerland, a discussion has been initiated by the Swiss Academy of Sciences that devel-
oped as a result of workshops with life scientists from Swiss academic institutions on ways of
addressing the misuse potential of biological research [35]. Similar initiatives in which benefits
and risks of DURC can be openly discussed have been launched in many countries and are
needed to raise awareness within the scientific community. However, it should be noted that
we have sufficient regulations in place to ensure biosafety and biosecurity. Moreover, we have
already seen the benefits of synthetic viruses. The recovery of the pandemic 1918 influenza
virus provided important mechanistic insight into critical determinants of virus tropism,
transmission, and pathogenicity. Likewise, the recovery of the SARS-like bat coronavirus shed
light on determinants of zoonotic infection. Such information is urgently needed to under-
stand cross-species transmission of contemporary virus strains and to assess the risk of emerg-
ing pandemic viruses. Synthetic viruses also allow us to explore novel concepts to combat virus
infection, such as virus attenuation by large-scale recoding, pioneered by Wimmer and col-
leagues [18]. It is foreseeable that such concepts will greatly increase our preparedness to
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emerging viruses because it is now just a matter of weeks to generate synthetic viruses from
genomic sequences and at the same time to synthesize attenuated candidate vaccine strains.
The fast technological advances in synthetic biology illustrate that the breadth of synthetic
biology goes beyond DURC, and our discussions should be well balanced to allow this novel
technology to evolve. We’re just beginning to explore the potential of synthetic biology that is
expected to become a powerful tool to reveal groundbreaking insights in all fields of life
sciences.
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